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T here is an oft-quoted saying by the French poet and es-sayist Paul Val佴ry (1871-1945) according to which the
First World War confronted humanity with the fact that civi-
lizations too are mortal beings (Val佴ry 1919, p.94).1 In the
context of the intellectual history of modern China, it might
be more accurate to say that in the wake of the war, Chinese
thinkers learned that Western civilization in particular was
mortal, if not already moribund. This at least is how the story
was and still is often framed: the postwar period in China
was one of national as well as cultural 野awakening冶 (
觉悟 ) (see Wang 2016, pp. 41-48) and entailed a call for
nothing less than a 野liberation from the West冶 (Zheng 2011).2
Generally speaking, the discourse surrounding the reception
of the First World War in China hinges on fluid terms such as
野civilization冶 and 野culture冶 and draws heavily on dramatic
metaphors of 野death,冶 野awakening,冶 and 野rebirth.冶 Perhaps
this already indicates that the war does not figure so much as
a factual event in this context, but rather as a narrative struc-
ture, one allowing for a decoupling as well as recombination
of dis cursive elements from histori cally and culturally dis-
tinct traditions, at least on a more abstract level. Admittedly,
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the horror of trench warfare, massive civilian casualties, and unimaginable de-
struction during the 野Great War冶 may seem to rail against the adoption of such a
dispassionate approach. However, we are not in my view merely dealing with a
stubborn indifference to the cruelty and contingency of historical events which
always threaten to shatter the crystal palace of philosophical abstraction.3 In ret-
rospect, we can clearly see that the brutal reality of armed conflict did not pre-
vent Western as well as Chinese thinkers from approaching the struggle between
the great powers as an opportunity for reassessing their respective traditions as
well as the prospects for a possible encounter or reconciliation between them. In
turn, such a rethinking was seen as a response to very real and pressing socio-po-
litical issues. After all, as the historian James Q. Whitman claims, in the modern
conception of war, the latter is supposed to deliver a 野verdict,冶 in the sense that
野victory in war either proves or legitimates a certain cultural, moral, or meta-
physical value冶 (De Warren 2014, p. 727).
To be sure, the many problems besetting the embattled nations were widely
reported in Chinese media (Sachsenmaier 2007, p. 118), even if the First World
War seems not to have been primarily approached from a 野phenomenological冶
standpoint focused on the experience of soldiers and civilians on the frontlines by
most Chinese thinkers. Travel journals and reports of Chinese living in Europe at
the time published after the war contain detailed eyewitness accounts which offer
a more personal and lively counterweight to the somewhat dreary and repetitive
discourse on the 野Decline of the West冶 often associated with this period.4 As Eu-
gene W. Chiu丘为君 indicates, while the Chinese experience of the 野European
War冶 ( 欧战), as it still sometimes referred to in China, was at first char-
acterized by a certain detachment, the mass of reports and analyses in journals
and newspapers allowing the events on the Western front to be approached as a
gargantuan 野text,冶 Chinese commentators gradually shifted their attention to the
actual living conditions of common people caught up in the war as well (Chiu
2005, p. 94, p. 118). Just as importantly, many if not all intellectuals in China
were highly concerned with how the situation in Europe would impact the
East-Asian context, especially after Japan (aided by Great Britain) started moving
in on Germany爷s concessions in Shandong province. As such, they were hardly
unaware of the global dimension and broader geopolitical implications of what
was, after all, an increasingly worldwide conflict. What is crucial to point out
however is that more philosophically minded observers approached the war not
so much as a factual occurrence, but rather from a more macroscopic perspective,
that is to say, as an epochal event (in a quasi-Badiouian sense) necessitating an
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野awakening冶 and a retrospective insight into its larger historical and cultural
causes and conditions. China爷s definitive loss of Shandong to Japanese imperial-
ist ambitions following the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 obviously
played an important role in this respect.
As Nicolas De Warren notes with respect to the philosophical response to the
war in Europe, it is important to bear in mind that when the First World War
broke out, it was also greeted with a certain sense of enthusiasm by some
thinkers, as an event harboring the potential for a revolutionization of society and
a 野destructive renewal冶 of the world within itself (see De Warren 2014, p. 716).5
Likewise, in China, figures as diverse as the radical Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 (1879-
1942) and the more moderate and reconciliatory Du Yaquan杜亚泉 (1873-1933)
saw the Great War as a tragic manifestation of the patriotism of the citizens of
European nations. As such, it was also an opportunity to reflect on what they per-
ceived to be a lack of patriotic spirit among their compatriots and raise the Chi-
nese nation from its state of slumber and stagnation (see Zheng 2011, pp. 70-71
and Zhang 2016, p. 113).6 As Du wrote: 野the mind of organisms is always stimu-
lated and aroused to action through impressions coming from its surroundings.
The same is the case for the people of a country ( 国民). Our self-ab-
sorbed and protective compatriots have remained in a state of stagnation for
thousands of years due to a lack of stimuli from the outside world冶 (Du 1914, p.
187). Additionally, there was a surprising amount of Germanophile sentiment a-
mong Chinese intellectuals after the war broke out, at least until China officially
declared war on Germany in 1917. Contributors to the flagship journal of the
New Culture Movement New Youth ( 新青年) such as Chen Duxiu
saw Germany as a 野springtime people冶 ( 青春之国 民 ),
whose cultural energy they contrasted with that of older and 野decaying冶 Euro-
pean nations, most notably France, as the birthplace of a revolution that had
failed to make good on its promises and normative demands on a global scale
(see Zhao 2017, pp. 109-12 and Zhang 2016, p. 112).
In more general terms, a relatively positive appraisal of the intellectual im-
pact of the war is still evidenced by contemporary Chinese observers. The Tai-
wanese scholar Edward W. Chiu for instance presents the Great War as a verita-
ble catalyst for 野Enlightenment冶 in China (Chiu 2005). The mainland Chinese
historian Zheng Shiqu郑师渠 on his part has argued that these dramatic histori-
cal events allowed the West to overcome an arrogant and exaggerated belief in
the merits of its own civilization, while at the same time freeing Chinese thinkers
from decades of self-depreciation and feelings of cultural inferiority (Zheng
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1997, pp. 213-14). Similarly, Xu Guoqi, a historian who has done much to draw
attention to the neglected role of China in the Great War, characterizes the latter
as a 野vehicle for China爷s transformation, renewal, and regeneration冶 (Xu 2005,
p. 10). As he puts it, 野the war provided the momentum and the opportunity for
China to redefine its relations with the world through its efforts to inject itself in-
to the war and thus position itself within the family of nations冶 (ibid., p. 9).
While such arguments are probably intended to be descriptive rather than ideo-
logical, it should at the same time remind us of the importance of carefully con-
sidering in what sort of narrative the Chinese response to the war is framed and
retold. According to Dominic Sachsenmaier, already at the time, 野a variety of
groups in China, from free-trade liberalists to early Marxists [...] saw the Great
War as part of a teleological history.冶 (Sachsenmaier 2007, p. 120). In Xu Guo-
qi爷s opinion, the ultimate explanation behind China爷s apparent eagerness to join
the war effort is to be looked for in what he calls the Chinese 野obsession冶 (Xu
2005, p. 2) with joining the ranks of the international order, an attitude which
supposedly also conditioned the overall response of Chinese intellectuals to the
outbreak of the war. However, if we direct our attention to analyses of the cultur-
al-historical trajectory seen as leading up to the war, specifically those made by
culturally conservative thinkers such as Du Yaquan, a less clear-cut picture im-
poses itself.7 More precisely, Xu爷s approach seems to underestimate the extent to
which reflections on the war were not only about an imagined and long-awaited
convergence between China and the West and were not merely focused on the
prospect of China finally coming into its own as one nation-state among others,
but also gave rise to more ambiguous and at times incongruous reflections on the
nature and limits of modernity and its political institutions. How else are we to
make sense of something like Zhang Dongsun爷s张东荪(1886-1973) blunt decla-
ration that the war in Europe had proven that 野judgement day has come for both
nationalism and capitalism, these [forms of culture] cannot be sustained any
longer冶 (quoted in Gao 1999, p. 10)?
At the very least, the ab ove observations already indicate that the Chinese re
sponse to the Great War, in which China participated as a 野forgotten ally冶 (Alex-
eeva 2015)8 supporting the Allied Forces by dispatching an estimated 140.000
Chinese laborers to the Western Front,9 has to be framed in a broader historical
The 野Great War冶 in Chinese Intellectual History as Event and Narrative
43窑 窑
Critical Theory Vol.3 No.1
context before we can go on analyzing the position of an event such as war in
modern Chinese intellectual history. The two Opium Wars and China爷s defeat at
the hands of Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 had already made it
clear that the waning Qing state needed to adopt modern (especially military)
technology. With the increasing implausibility of maintaining a rigid conceptual
distinction between a Chinese 野substance冶( 体) and a Western 野function冶 or
野application冶( 用), the adoption of technology was gradually discovered not
be a mere matter of 野technique冶 ( 术) as opposed and inferior to 野learning冶
( 学), but to involve the appropriation of 野science冶( 格致学, later
科学, see Elman 2004) as well. In this context, 野science冶 was understood
not so much as a mathematized form of objective inquiry, but rather as a much
more generally applicable and socially performative 野method冶 and 野spirit冶(see
Luo 2000, pp. 57-66) that would allow China to successfully achieve moderniza-
tion and position itself in the world as a sovereign nation. As Wang Hui汪晖 has
aptly put it, science thus took on the form of a 野moral imperative冶(Wang 1989,
p. 23). Moreover, modernization was seen as something that not only had to oc-
cur on an institutional and political level, but also on that of individual virtue, not
in the least by radically reinterpreting the relation between the 野private冶 sphere
of morality and the 野public冶 domain of politics, a view epitomized by Liang
Qichao爷s梁启超 (1873-1929) call for the creation of a 野new citizen冶 or 野new
people冶 ( 新民 ).10 The growing awareness of the need for science, as
blueprint for culture as a whole, is usually understood as coinciding with an in-
creasing loss of the normative power of the Chinese tradition, particularly of
Confucianism, as a model for political governance, communal life, and individu-
al conduct. The failure of the newly founded and politically unstable Republic to
prevent general Yuan Shikai from restoring the monarchy in 1915, a move that
was unfortunately backed by Kang Youwei爷s康有为 (1858-1927) Association
for the Confucian Religion ( 孔教会 ) which proposed installing
Confucianism as a state religion, further fueled calls for the abolishment of tradi-
tions seen as inhibiting the emergence of a 野new culture冶( 新文化)
and to what the intellectual historian Luo Zhitian罗志田 has termed a 野worship
of the new.冶 (see Luo 2017, pp. 1-60).
Within this familiar synoptic account, the period following the First World
War is usually interpreted as signaling a shift away from such 野worship of the
new冶 and a celebration of all things Western toward a more conflicted and
at times syncretistic approach to what became known as the 野problem of Eastern
and Western culture冶 ( 东西文化问题 ). As far as Du
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Yaquan for instance was concerned, the war had endowed the seemingly straight-
forward yet highly changeable and indeterminate terms 野old冶 and 野new冶 with a
completely different sense. In his view, the 野new,冶 which had previously more or
less meant imitating the West, now had to give way to a different kind of 野novel-
ty,冶 that is to say, to the creation of a genuinely 野new冶 form of culture and civi-
lization that would not simply coincide with the one-sided emulation of the West,
but combine elements of the 野new冶 and the 野old冶 within itself (see Du 1919b,
pp. 401-02). Just as importantly, after the war, 野the West冶 ceased to be seen as a
consistent totality, but instead began to appear as a force-field of contradictory if
not antagonistic forces (see Luo 2017, pp. 250-51). The spectacle of advanced
technology being put to the service of relentless slaughter and destruction had
caused science to be 野put to shame by the cruelty of its applications冶 (Val佴ry
1919, p. 97). In turn, the continuity between 野science冶 and 野democracy,冶 as
symbols for the epistemological and institutional requirements of modern society
(and quasi-religious objects of faith in the discourse of the New Culture Move-
ment, see Wang 1989, pp. 22-23) was ruptured, in the sense that scientific and
technological reason had clearly failed to translate into a rational organization of
individual societies and the international order as a whole (see Han 2017). In-
stead, a gaping chasm had opened up between 野force冶 ( 力) and 野principle冶 (
理) (Zhang 2016). The reputation of the sort of social Darwinism previously em-
braced by many Chinese thinkers suffered considerably in the process (Xu 2018,
p. 163). Additionally, Western philosophers associated with German militarism
became symbols of the malaise of modernity and prominent targets of critique.11
In a lecture entitled 野The Crisis of European Culture and the Direction of
China爷s New Culture冶 (
欧洲文化之危机及中国新文化之趋向) from 1922, Zhang Junmai張
勱君 (1887-1969) went so far as to claim that continuing to slavishly emulate
Western nations after the war would signify the end of culture ( 文化) as
such, since there would no longer be any 野patterns/refinement冶 ( 文 ) or
野transformation冶( 化) (Zhang 1922, p. 238) to begin with. To be sure, al-
though it is tempting to be carried along by the sweeping statements many intel-
lectuals made at the time, some nuance and restraint is necessary in this context.
This much Zhang Junmai actually indicates himself a little further on in the text
of the same speech, when he argues against making simplistic overgeneraliza
tions concerning Western and Chinese culture. A similar caution should be dis
played when it comes to the supposed discrediting of science in postwar China. It
is often claimed that the destruction and suffering brought on by the war put a
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definite end to the optimistic belief in science, the most well-known example un-
doubtedly being Liang Qichao爷s call to awaken from the 野dream of the omnipo-
tence of science冶 following his tour of Europe between 1919 and 1920 (see
Zheng 2006). However, what Wang Hui has called the 野community of scientific
discourse冶 ( 科学话语共同体) - a community extending
beyond the 野scientific community冶 in the narrow sense, thus including all intel-
lectuals who invoked concepts derived from scientific reasoning or articulated
their views by appealing to the logic of the discourse of science - managed to far
outlive such largely rhetorical attacks. Wang argues that the two world wars did
not end up undermining the authority of science, quite to the contrary: 野this com-
petitive world scene reinforced sovereign states爷 demands for science and tech-
nology, further guaranteeing the development of science and technology, profes-
sionalization, state control of science and technology, and the dominant position
of the scientific worldview冶(Wang 2008, p. 131). In his view, this dominant posi-
tion is also reflected in the influential 野debate on science and metaphysics冶 from
1923, a debate in which 野metaphysicians冶 such as Zhang Junmai and Liang
Qichao argued for maintaining the proper boundaries between scientific and hu-
manistic modes of reasoning and cast doubt on the applicability of a scientific
outlook to the domains of 野existence,冶 野morality,冶野culture,冶 and 野politics,冶 as
distinct fields of knowledge and action irreducible to 野science.冶 As Wang Hui
emphasizes, the position of the 野metaphysical冶 camp was thus not that of an out-
right rejection of science, but rather reflected an implicit acceptance of the scien-
tific attempt to arrive at a rational division of labor and functionally differentiated
taxonomy of knowledge across fields of learning which could no longer be re-
constituted into a coherent whole or an unmediated continuum (see Wang 2008,
pp. 132-37).
Crucially, questioning the 野omnipotence冶 of science in the context of the
postwar 野awakening冶 to its limitations and pathological consequences almost
never came down to a straightforward call for the restoration of traditional forms
of knowledge, but rather entailed a shift toward an assertion of the importance
and autonomy of other, equally novel fields of knowledge, such as 野philosophy.冶
12 This much becomes apparent in the following passage from an article Zhang
Dongsun published in Liang Qichao爷s journal 学灯 (
) in 1919 in response to Chen Duxiu爷s continued pleas in favor of the
authority of 野Mr. Science冶( 赛先生) and 野Mr. Democracy冶 (
德先生):
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And now that we have just experienced the anguish and suffering of the war, every-
one feels the need to invite Mr. Philosophy [ 费先生, fei being the abbre-
viation for earlier transliterations of the term 野philosophy冶 such as 费禄苏
非亚 and 斐录所费亚 before the adoption of the Japanese neologism
哲学] back in to provide us with a fundamental and peaceful solution.
This is because Mr. Philosophy can be of great help in allowing Mr. Science to reach his
goal. Moreover, if we as human beings want to attain a more exalted state of existence,
we have no choice but to rely on Mr. Philosophy. In sum, if the previous ten years can
be described as a dictatorship of Mr. Science, we have now entered the era of a com-
monwealth of Mr. Science and Mr. Philosophy. (Quoted in Dai 2009, p. 145.)13
Here, 野science冶 and 野philosophy冶 have already become universally applica-
ble categories of knowledge that are no longer constrained by geography, culture,
or time and are explicitly framed in relation to the equally universalist desidera-
tum of social freedom (a 野commonwealth冶 instead of a 野dictatorship冶). Follow-
ing the abandonment of traditional Chinese taxonomies of knowledge and its
concomitant normative expectations, it would be these universalized terms that
would serve as vehicles for the reassertion and renegotiation of cultural particu-
larity. Additionally, we should bear in mind that, at least to some extent, Chinese
postwar critiques of science and 野Western materialism冶 echoed the Romantic
self-critique of many European intellectuals at the time (see Zheng 1997, p. 213,
Sachsenmaier 2007, p. 111, and 2017, p. 23). As such, they should not
be confused with indiscriminate assaults on Western culture as a whole, but can
rather be seen as creative appropriations and reconceptualizations of such au-
to-critiques.14 The postwar European interest in Chinese 野wisdom,冶 or the 野wis-
dom of the East冶 in general, undoubtedly influenced the attitude of Chinese intel-
lectuals toward their own tradition as well.15 What is also important to remember
is that such reappraisals of the value of Chinese culture were not always met with
a warm welcome in China. Someone like the liberal pragmatist Hu Shi 胡适
(1891-1962) feared that the protests directed at Western power politics and the
perfectly justified critiques of the atrocities of the Great War would degenerate
into a renewed Chinese sense of 野arrogance冶 and 野complacency,冶 the Orientalist
admiration for China expressed by some Western scholars in his view merely
counting as a 野temporary psychopathological state冶 (quoted in Zheng 1997, p.
210).16
The 野Great War冶 in Chinese Intellectual History as Event and Narrative
47窑 窑
Critical Theory Vol.3 No.1
As the title of Zhang Junmai爷s lecture quoted in the above indicates, what was at
stake for Chinese thinkers in their reflections on the war was both the 野crisis冶 of
Western culture as well as the development of a 野new culture冶 for China. The
adoption of a civilizational discourse in which a wedge was driven between
野novelty冶 or 野modernity冶 on the one hand and 野the West冶 on the other was a
means of articulating this ambiguous and unstable position. In the process, 野con-
servative冶 critics of 野Western冶 modernity tried to wrest equally 野Western冶 ide-
ologies such as Marxism and socialism from their cultural confines and redefine
them as truly universal political projects that could draw on or be reconciled with
the Chinese tradition. As Du Yaquan for one insisted, after the war, 野the old冶
Europe had to give way to a new civilization propelled by the rebirth of the 野old冶
culture of China in combination with a 野new冶 (i.e. non-militarist) Western cul-
ture. It is not so surprising then to find the 野conservative冶 Du Yaquan declaring
the lower classes of all countries to be the true subjects and victors of the war and
greeting the rise of international socialism with much enthusiasm. In his view, it
is only from the perspective of the 野old world冶 of militarism where 野right is
might冶 that the end of the war and a farewell to its 野instruments of misfortune冶
(不祥之凶器 ) could count as defeat instead of a liberation. (Du 1919a, pp.
206-208). Du believed the abolition of class differences and economic inequali-
ties to be the only sure means to put an end to war once and for all (see Du 1914,
p.191 and Du 1918, p. 458). His position thus hardly shares anything in common
with a straightforwardly conservative withdrawal into already discredited politi-
cal and ethical models without any regard for the structural features and ideologi-
cal discourse of modern societies.
The postwar 野problem of Eastern and Western culture冶 gave rise to heated
debates between radical iconoclasts and more moderate thinkers who still be-
lieved in the viability of certain aspects of the Chinese tradition. However, both
shared a mistrust of the Western powers following the 野betrayal冶 of the Ver-
sailles Peace Treaty, which led to student demonstrations and strikes across the
whole of China, ushering in what became known as the May Fourth Movement.
As such, they shared a common concern over 野culture冶 ( 文化, ),
and not merely 野civilization冶 ( 文明, ), that is to say, a form
of 野awakening冶 and 野enlightenment冶 that would, in one way or another, reflect
and serve the particularities of China as a nation, regardless of whether these par-
ticularities were understood in a culturally determinate or a more universalist
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sense. After the Versailles 野betrayal,冶 cultural conservatives had to abandon the
notion that Woodrow Wilson爷s League of Nations counted as an incarnation of
the age-old Confucian idea of datong 大同 (野great unity冶) (see Xu 2005, pp.
253-54). Nor could Chen Duxiu still speak, as he had done in the period of
short-lived enthusiasm immediately following the German defeat, of a 野victory
of universal principle over power冶(公理战胜强权 , or, more colloquially: 野the
victory of right over might冶) (quoted in Gao 1999: 9). Instead, Chen had come to
terms with the fact that 野universal principle冶 always remains dependent on the
support of political and military power, without which it would remain an easy
prey for the powers that be (see Chen 1919). Clearly then, following the war,
both radicals as well as conservatives were engaged in a pursuit of the 野new,冶
that is to say, a different kind of 野novelty,冶 the semantic horizon of which had
expanded considerably in the meantime.
1 What is usually ignored however is that Val佴ry爷s melancholy diagnosis is followed up by a
celebration of the 野European genius冶 in the second part of his text.
2 More precisely, Zheng Shiqu郑师渠 understands such 野liberation冶 as coinciding with an
end of the normative appeal of capitalism and the rise of historical materialism, as if the
social reality of the war had opened up the cracks in the ideological superstructure of the
New Culture Movement necessary for Chinese Marxism to impose itself. The question
remains however if culturalizing this 野liberation冶 in terms of 野Chinese and Western
culture冶 can adequately describe the historical reality of global capitalism to begin with.
3 That being said, a mere decade after the Second World War, even as gentle a soul as the
Confucian philosopher Tang Junyi唐君毅 (1909-1978) already showed little or no qualms
about endowing what he called 野military consciousness冶 with a moral-metaphysical
significance. In his opposition to materialist and naturalist forms of philosophy seen as
lying at the root of most socio-political problems, Tang爷s main concern had become that
of arguing that warfare cannot simply be analyzed in functionalist terms, since 野military
consciousness冶 entails a quasi-religious liberation from any attachment to the contingency
of life. His line of reasoning is worth reproducing at some length: 野The cruelty resulting
from warfare is not tantamount to cruelty on the level of the soldier爷s consciousness.
When a soldier kills an enemy on the battlefield, he seems to show no love for the other
person爷s life and to take leave of his own humaneness. However, on a spiritual level, the
soldier has already confronted the possibility of losing his own life without fear and
overcome his attachment to life. If this form of consciousness is directly universalized and
extended to the enemy, the soldier will naturally come to regard the enemy as someone
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equally capable of overcoming the attachment to life. Therefore, on the level of the
soldier爷s consciousness, killing the enemy is not contrary to humaneness ( 仁).冶 (Tang
1958, p. 354).
4 Professor Jing Chunyu 景春雨 at Shanghai University爷s Department of Literature is
currently involved in a study of Chinese accounts (by figures as diverse as businessmen
and novelists) of their wartime experiences in France.
5 As De Warren argues: 野Philosophical discourse became transfigured into the pursuit of
war by other means much as the war became an occasion for philosophical thinking by
other means.冶 Ibid. Several scholars believe that the First World War played a
considerable role in the already emerging rift between continental and analytical
philosophy and served as a catalyst for the closely related decline of British Idealism after
the latter爷s German Idealist sources fell into disrepute. See Vrahimis 2015, pp. 84-93 and
Morrow 1982.
6 A few months after the armistice, Du wrote a short article outlining the various 野benefits冶
(利益 ) China had gained during the conflict in predominantly pragmatic terms (Du
1919b).
7 See the author爷s forthcoming text, 野Beyond the Warring States: the First World War and
the Redemptive Critique of Modernity in the Work of Du Yaquan (1873-1933)冶. For
studies on the impact of First World War on Chinese intellectuals, specifically on cultural
conservatives, see Zheng 2002, Zheng 2008, and Sachsenmaier 2007. To date, one of the
only analyses of the relation between the war and the emergence of 野New Confucianism冶
in particular is Lei 2015, but I was unfortunately unable to gain access to this source.
8 Incidentally, this is also the title of Rana Mitter爷s 2013 book reappraising China爷s role in
the Second World War (Mitter 2013). For Olga Alexeeva (2015, p. 44), the fact that the
design for a grandiose mural entitled 野Panth佴on de la guerre,冶 commissioned by the
French State while the war was still ongoing as a celebration of all allied nations and their
contributions to the envisaged victory, originally included Chinese laborers, only to be
replaced by the figures of American soldiers in the final version, symbolizes the fact that
the Chinese contribution to the war was consigned to oblivion in Western historical
consciousness.
9 See Xu 2005, pp. 114-54. The Republic of China adopted a strategy known as 野laborers in
the place of soldiers冶 ( 以工代兵), laborers which were recruited and
dispatched to Europe through the intermediary of private companies, thus allowing China
to retain a semblance of neutrality while still supporting the Allied forces against
Germany. This strategy was devised by Liang Shiyi 梁士诒 (1869-1933), a cabinet
minister and a close confidant of Yuan Shikai. Liang, sometimes dubbed the 野Chinese
Machiavelli,冶 had already started arguing for the strategic importance of China entering
the war at the side of the Allied Forces in 1914. He saw it as a strategic means for realizing
China爷s interests and gaining full recognition as a nation-state, not in the least through a
return of German concessions in Shandong. See Xu 2005, pp. 82-83, p. 87, pp. 90-91.
Ironically, most of the Chinese laborers sent to the frontlines were recruited from
50窑 窑
Shandong province, which was later ceded to Japan at the Paris Peace Conference.
10 See in particular the chapters 论公德 (On Public Virtue) and 论私
德 (On Private Virtue) in Liang 1902-1906, pp. 16-22 and pp. 161-94.
11 It appears that the wartime and postwar discrediting of Nietzsche as a philosopher of
militarism, not in the least by British propaganda efforts which managed to spread the
appealing myth according to which every German soldier carried around a copy of
in his backpack instead of the Bible (see Vrahimis 2015, p. 86),
seems to have influenced Chinese thinkers as well. See for example Cai Yuanpei爷s蔡元
培 (1863-1940) text 大战与哲学 (The Great War and Philosophy),
Cai 1918, pp. 200-201.
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